Topics

About this talk

The Society for Applied Philosophy and the Yeoh Tiong Lay Centre for Philosophy Politics and Law is delighted to invite R. Jay Wallace, in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, to deliver the Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2026, entitled "The Generality of Moral Reasoning and the Specificity of Moral Wrongs: On the Justification and the Direction of Moral Obligations." Abstract: The wrongness of at least some behaviors seems, intuitively, to depend on the general effects of a system of moral principles that permit them; this much is common to contractualist and to rule-consequentialist theories of the moral right. Examples include invading the privacy of someone or deceiving them for personal advantage. Making sense of moral obligations in cases of this kind seems to require attention to what it would be like if principles that permit individuals to violate them were generally accepted and complied with. A further conviction about the same cases, however, is that the obligations at issue are directed to specific individuals; agents who flout them do not merely act wrongly, but wrong e.g. the person whose privacy they invade or whom they deceive. But it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make sense of this feature of the relevant obligations: to the extent their justification appeals to tertiary benefits their general acceptance makes available to everyone, the idea that the specific victims of their violation have a privileged basis for objecting to it becomes elusive. The talk will discuss this challenge and then consider some strategies for responding to it. An important idea that Wallace hopes to defend is that there can be a specific wrong done to the victim only when there is sufficient compliance with the obligation to make available the tertiary benefits that figure in its justification. A drinks reception will follow.

→ More information & booking (opens in new tab)